The Virginia Defamation Law Blog

September 18, 2026

Accusations of Theft Held Actionable Absent Equivocation

A recent decision from the Western District of Virginia offers a clean illustration of a principle that decides many Virginia defamation cases at the outset: context and word choice often determine whether a challenged statement will be treated as a verifiable assertion of fact or a non-actionable expression of opinion. In Bright v. Brooks (W.D. Va. July 29, 2026), Senior U.S. District Judge James P. Jones, applying Virginia law on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, held that a supervisor’s accusations that a former employee had stolen property, committed burglary, and engaged in criminal conduct were falsifiable statements of fact sufficient to survive dismissal. At the same time, the court observed that a differently phrased accusation, hedged as conjecture, might instead be protected opinion.

Janet Bright, a former coordinator at the Lee County Department of Social Services, sued the department and its director, Michele Brooks, alleging she was fired in retaliation for whistleblower reports and that Brooks defamed her as part of the retaliatory scheme. The defamation claim arose from an October 2023 incident. On the night of October 22, Bright entered the DSS offices after hours with her sister, Julie Johnson (herself a DSS employee but whose employment status at the time was in dispute) so that Johnson could retrieve a document and her belongings, which she carried out in a donated duffel bag. The next day, Brooks made a series of statements about the incident to the Lee County Sheriff’s Office and other county officials. Bright was placed on administrative leave on October 25 and terminated on November 20.

August 31, 2026

Mistakes Are Not Malice: Subjective Doubt vs. Negligent Research

by Lee E. Berlik

In defamation cases where actual malice must be shown, a plaintiff must prove the defendant made a false statement with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of falsity. “Reckless disregard” generally means a high degree of subjective awareness that a statement is probably false. A mere failure to sufficiently investigate the factual basis for a statement, without more, does not establish recklessness unless there are obvious reasons to doubt the veracity of a source. A federal court in Virginia granted summary judgment for the defendants earlier this month in a trade libel case in which the plaintiff could not raise a genuine dispute of material fact on actual malice. The case is Pecos River Talc LLC v. Emory (E.D. Va. Aug. 19, 2026). Although it applies New Jersey substantive law, its reasoning rests almost entirely on federal First Amendment precedent that applies with equal force in Virginia.

The defendants were pathologists experienced in mesothelioma science who often testified for plaintiffs in asbestos litigation. In March 2020, they published “Malignant mesothelioma following repeated exposures to cosmetic talc: A case series of 75 patients” in the American Journal of Industrial Medicine, and later repeated its conclusions in a letter to the editor and a MedicalResearch.com article. Pecos River Talc LLC, a subsidiary of Johnson & Johnson, alleged that the study disparaged its product. The suit centered on three categories of statements. The “review claim” asserted that subject exposures were identified through sworn deposition testimony and interrogatory answers. The “no overlap claim” presented the 75 subjects as additional to the 33 subjects in an earlier study by Jacqueline Moline. And the “exposure claim” stated that all 75 subjects’ only known asbestos exposure was cosmetic talc. Discovery established that the no overlap claim was literally false in that eight of the 75 subjects in fact overlapped with Moline’s cohort. Summary judgment was nevertheless granted in the defendants’ favor because Pecos River failed to prove the authors published any of the statements with actual malice.

July 29, 2026

Without Defamatory Sting, Privilege Defenses Go Unaddressed

by Lee E. Berlik

When a defamation defendant can invoke statutory reporting immunity, anti-SLAPP immunity, and common law qualified privilege all at once, one might expect an appellate court to resolve the case on one of those defenses. In Wang v. Taylor, Record No. 2006-25-3 (Va. Ct. App. July 7, 2026), the Court of Appeals of Virginia did no such thing. In an unpublished memorandum opinion by Judge Bernhard, the court affirmed a demurrer to a nurse practitioner’s defamation claim on the narrow ground that the challenged statements lacked the requisite defamatory “sting.” Because sting was lacking, the court found it unnecessary to address any of the three immunity defenses the defendants had raised. The opinion is a clean illustration of the court’s gatekeeping role in defamation cases and of how a plaintiff cannot support a claim by isolating minor factual inaccuracies within a communication whose defamatory substance is conceded to be true.

The opinion presents the following facts. Zhan Wang, a licensed nurse practitioner, worked in a psychiatric practice at Carilion New River Valley Medical Center beginning in August 2019. Laura Taylor directed the relevant department. The two had a contentious relationship: Wang had refused to sign a noncompete agreement in September 2022, had reported various patient-care concerns to Taylor throughout 2022 and 2023, and had escalated concerns about allegedly unlawful practices to an authority at the Virginia Board of Nursing. Wang submitted a 90-day resignation notice by email on April 16, 2023. In August 2023, Taylor filed a report with the Virginia Department of Health Professions under Code § 54.1-2400.6, the statute governing mandatory reports concerning health professionals.

July 15, 2026

Virginia’s Vicarious-Liability Presumption Applies at Pleading Stage

by Lee E. Berlik

Several years ago, this blog covered Garnett v. Remedi SeniorCare of Virginia, LLC, 892 F.3d 140 (4th Cir. 2018), in which the Fourth Circuit held that an employer could not be held vicariously liable for a coworker’s crude and offensive remarks because they fell outside the scope of the speaker’s employment. The apparent lesson was that a Virginia employer is not a guarantor of everything its employees say, and that a defamation plaintiff who cannot connect the statement to the employee’s job responsibilities will not survive a motion to dismiss. A recent unpublished Fourth Circuit decision, Auckland v. Gilead Sciences, Inc., complicates that lesson. Applying a pleading-stage presumption that the Supreme Court of Virginia developed after Garnett, the court vacated the dismissal of a vicarious-liability defamation claim and, over a pointed dissent from Judge Wilkinson, held that the plaintiff’s complaint had pleaded sufficient facts to proceed.

Ian Auckland worked remotely from Southwest Virginia for Gilead Sciences, a California-based biopharmaceutical company, for more than nine years. In 2023, he applied for a preceptorship program associated with Gilead’s Key Accounts Team, a role viewed as a stepping-stone to a full-time position on the team. Hilary Zachry, a California employee who served as a mentor for the preceptorship program, allegedly favored other candidates. According to Auckland, Zachry falsely told a coworker that Auckland had said “I want to rip your panties off” during a brief conversation at a work conference in Nashville, and then directed that coworker to report the fabricated accusation to Gilead. Auckland was accepted into the program, but was soon investigated and terminated. He sued both Zachry and Gilead in the Western District of Virginia, asserting claims of defamation and defamation per se, and sought to hold Gilead vicariously liable for Zachry’s conduct.

June 27, 2026

Defamation Is Not Confined to Written or Spoken Words

by Lee E. Berlik

When we think of defamation, we typically think of words: a slanderous remark, a libelous article, a defamatory social media post. But in Hopkins v. Ryan, Record No. 1192-25-3 (Va. Ct. App. June 23, 2026), the Court of Appeals of Virginia reminded us that defamation can take forms far removed from the spoken or written word. In a published opinion by Judge Raphael, the court reversed the dismissal of a defamation claim based not on any statement in the conventional sense, but on a fabricated invoice. The court held that a false business document, doctored to be attributed to the plaintiff and published to a third party to destroy his professional reputation, can constitute actionable defamation under Virginia law.

The facts alleged in the amended complaint paint a picture of workplace sabotage. David Hopkins worked as a commission-only sales representative for Consolidated Electrical Distributors, Inc. (“CED”), an electrical wholesale-distribution company. Dan Ryan was his direct supervisor at CED’s Roanoke office. Hopkins had spent years building customer relationships and earning commissions, and one of his largest accounts was a client identified in the complaint as “Company C.” Hopkins had earned more than $100,000 in commissions from Company C and had secured its commitment to a $1.8 million apartment-development project — a deal that would have generated substantial additional commissions for him.

May 8, 2026

Calling Someone a “Sexual Predator” Is Not Necessarily Defamatory

by Lee E. Berlik

In a decision that should give comfort to political commentators everywhere, the Court of Appeals of Virginia reversed a $1,000,000 defamation verdict against a citizen who called a local school board chairman a “SEXUAL PREDATOR/HARASSER” on Facebook. The case is Petrak v. Sawyers, Record No. 0110-24-4 (Va. Ct. App. Oct. 21, 2025), and it offers a textbook illustration of the principle that even the most inflammatory language can be protected opinion when the speaker fully discloses the facts on which the opinion is based. The plaintiff, Ryan Sawyers, pointed out the lack of sexual harassment complaints against him or criminal convictions and argued that the “sexual predator” label was therefore false and defamatory. Although the trial court agreed with him, the Court of Appeals did not, and clarified that statements that fully disclose their factual predicate and do not imply the existence of undisclosed defamatory facts are not actionable if that factual predicate is true.

The basic facts of the case are these. Ryan Sawyers was the Chairman of the Prince William County School Board. While serving in that role, he commented on a local librarian’s Facebook photo, referring to her as a “LILF.” The defendant, Bill Petrak, interpreted the remark as vulgar sexual innuendo and was disgusted by it, particularly considering Sawyers was a married man, serving on the school board, and running for Congress. (Sawyers denied the comment was sexual, claiming with a straight face that the acronym stood for “Librarian I’d Like to Fund”). Petrak, who had been leading a recall effort against Sawyers, responded with his own Facebook post in a group called “PWC Education Reform.” In that post, Petrak shared screenshots of Sawyers’s LILF comment, a tweet in which Sawyers had thanked then-Senator Al Franken, and a photograph of Franken groping (or pretending to grope) a sleeping woman on a military plane. Petrak added the following commentary:

Look closely and see the comment by Ryan Sawyers. It says “such a LILF”. I am told this person is a librarian. So basically Ryan Sawyers, a married man, is publicly saying on social media that he would like to have sex with this woman. If that isn’t the behavior of a SEXUAL PREDATOR or HARASSER I don’t know what is.

March 16, 2026

How Defamation’s Publication Requirement Limits the Relation-Back Doctrine

by Lee E. Berlik

The relation-back doctrine is a procedural mechanism that allows an amended pleading filed after the expiration of a statute of limitations to “relate back” to the filing date of the original complaint. The doctrine treats the amended pleading as if it had been filed on the date of the original complaint, thereby rescuing otherwise time-barred claims from dismissal. Its basic purpose is to permit parties to refine or clarify allegations as facts become better known, without forfeiting otherwise timely claims. After all, statutes of limitations exist to give defendants fair notice of potential liability, and if the original complaint already placed the defendant on notice of the general factual territory in dispute, allowing a later amendment within that same territory does not undermine the limitation period’s purpose. The defendant was already on notice; the amendment merely refines or expands a dispute they knew was coming.

The doctrine is codified in Virginia at Code § 8.01-6.1, which states that “an amendment of a pleading changing or adding a claim or defense against a party relates back to the date of the original pleadings for purposes of the statute of limitations if the court finds (i) the claim or defense asserted in the amended pleading arose out of the conduct, transaction or occurrence set forth in the original pleading, (ii) the amending party was reasonably diligent in asserting the amended claim or defense, and (iii) parties opposing the amendment will not be substantially prejudiced in litigating on the merits as a result of the timing of the amendment.” In federal court, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(c).

February 8, 2026

Association with Controversial Figures Held Not Defamatory

by Lee E. Berlik

In a recent decision underscoring the limits of defamation law in political contexts, a federal district court dismissed defamation claims brought by the American Conservative Union and its foundation against former employees who allegedly linked the organizations to George Soros, Mark Zuckerberg, and John Arnold. The court’s ruling in American Conservative Union v. Institute for Legislative Analysis clarifies that merely associating an organization with controversial figures—even those despised by the organization’s core constituency—does not constitute actionable defamation under Virginia law.

The plaintiffs, the American Conservative Union (ACU) and the American Conservative Union Foundation (ACUF), host the annual Conservative Political Action Conference (CPAC) and publish ratings of state and federal lawmakers based on voting records. In February 2024, the defendant Institute for Legislative Analysis published a series of articles titled the “Soros Files,” authored by a former ACU employee. The articles included statements such as:

“Soros, Zuckerberg and Arnold have so heavily invested in CPAC to control its scorecard”
“Meet CPAC Billionaire Funder George Soros”
“CPAC has at least two Soros-funded prosecutors on its staff”

January 20, 2026

Accusations of Sexual Abuse Held Protected by Ecclesiastical Abstention Doctrine

by Lee E. Berlik

The ecclesiastical abstention doctrine traces its roots to Supreme Court precedent holding that the First Amendment secures a sphere of institutional autonomy for religious organizations. Under this jurisprudence, churches enjoy freedom from secular intrusion in matters central to their identity, including questions of faith, doctrine, and internal governance. Historically, courts applied the doctrine primarily in disputes involving church property and the appointment or removal of clergy. More recently, however, the Supreme Court has clarified that the doctrine extends equally to disagreements concerning internal church administration. (See, e.g., Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese for U.S. of Am. & Canada v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 710 (1976)). In essence, when resolving a dispute would require a civil court to engage in substantial interpretation of religious law or ecclesiastical structure, the court must defer to the determinations of the church’s highest adjudicatory body and treat those decisions as binding with respect to issues of doctrine and governance.

The doctrine does not shield churches from judicial review of matters that are wholly secular in nature. The central concern is whether adjudication would require courts to interpret religious doctrine or to second-guess ecclesiastical judgments; the doctrine does not require courts to abstain simply because a dispute involves religious actors or has some incidental connection to religious principles. For example, a false accusation that a church member punched another church member in the face would not be protected because such a statement can be evaluated under neutral principles of law, without reference to issues of faith or religious doctrine. One might assume a false accusation of sexual abuse would also fall into this category, but as with any defamation claim, it depends on the context in which the statement was made. If it’s clear that the term “sexual abuse” was being used according to a church’s definition of sexual abuse, the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine will indeed apply and protect the speaker from defamation liability. So held the Virginia Court of Appeals in the case of Catholic Diocese of Richmond v. Oliver Smalls, decided November 5, 2025.

December 20, 2025

Truth, as Defense, Must Match Defamatory Sting

by Lee E. Berlik

Truthful statements are generally not actionable as defamation. A substantially true statement that is factually accurate in all material respects and that does not imply any undisclosed defamatory message is not something upon which a defamation lawsuit may be brought. Still, a defendant who asserts a truth defense needs to establish not simply that some technical aspect of the statement is true but that its defamatory sting is true. When a published statement accuses the plaintiff of intentional criminal conduct, for example, the defendant cannot defeat a defamation per se claim by pointing to a technical or arguable inaccuracy in the statement as a whole that does not establish intentional criminal conduct.

Let’s look at last week’s decision in Patricia Thurston v. BankUnited, N.A., from the Western District of Virginia. Patricia Thurston owned residential real property in Roanoke County, which she sold in January 2024. Pike Title and Escrow, LLC, handled the closing and prepared a settlement statement showing that Thurston was to receive $66,484.74 in sale proceeds. Thurston provided wiring instructions for her Truist Bank account, and Pike Title transmitted those instructions to BankUnited, N.A., the bank that held Pike Title’s escrow account. On January 12, 2024, BankUnited wired the funds to Thurston’s account without incident, and the transaction initially appeared complete and proper. At the time of closing, a prior deed of trust on the property had been paid in full; Pike Title prepared a Certificate of Satisfaction reflecting that payoff and recorded it shortly thereafter, having charged Thurston a recording fee for that purpose.