Earlier this month, the Virginia Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Williamsburg Circuit Court to uphold a jury verdict against former circuit court judge Verbena Askew in the amount of $350,000 for defamation. Askew had made a comment to The Daily Press that plaintiff Brenda Collins, who had worked in the court over which then-judge Askew presided, “was institutionalized – that’s the only way you qualify for family leave.” The Daily Press did not actually publish the statement, but the Court found that the defamation occurred when the statement was made to the press.

A private individual claiming defamation must prove by a preponderance of the evidence (1) that the defamatory publication is false and (2) that the defendant “either knew it to be false, or believing it to be true, lacked reasonable grounds for such belief or acted negligently in failing to ascertain the facts on which the publication was based.” If the publication amounts to defamation per se, such as defamatory statements that impute an unfitness to perform official duties, the plaintiff is presumptively entitled to compensatory damages.

Askew first argued that she should not have to pay damages because her statement about Collins was never published by The Daily Press and thus did not proximately cause any injury to Collins. The Virginia Supreme Court rejected this argument, holding that theWburgCt.jpg evidence supported the jury’s finding that Askew made a defamatory statement to the press either knowing it was false or negligently failing to ascertain the facts. Because the jury found the statement amounted to per se defamation, it was entitled to presume that Collins suffered damages as a result, regardless of whether The Daily Press republished the statement.

Professional Timothy B. Hanks is a professional tax preparer who took offense at a television segment aired by WAVY Channel 10 in the Hampton Roads area that promised to inform viewers “how to avoid unscrupulous tax preparers,” then proceeded to tell a story involving an admitted mistake made by his company, Reliable Tax & Financial Services. Hanks sued the station for libel, libel per se, and libel per quod, seeking five million dollars in damages. Judge Doumar (Norfolk) rejected all three theories and, last month, dismissed the entire case with prejudice.

Libel per se and libel per quod are variations of a defamation cause of action. Under Virginia law, a claim for libel per se may exist for certain categories of defamatory statements deemed serious enough to warrant presumed damages. This includes statements such as those accusing a plaintiff of committing a crime involving “moral turpitude,” of being infected with a contagious disease, or, more commonly, of being unfit to perform the duties of his profession. Libel per quod, on the other hand, refers to statements the defamatory nature of which is not readily apparent, but which are understood by the recipient to be of a defamatory nature in light of extrinsic facts known by that person.

Hanks claimed the “unscrupulous” remark constituted defamation per se in that it imputed to him “an unfitness to perform the duties of office or employment for profit, a lack of integrity in the discharge of duties of such office, and the commission of a criminal Taxes.jpgoffense.” The court disagreed for several reasons, holding that the statements (1) are not “of or concerning” Hanks, (2) are not capable of defamatory construction, and (3) are constitutionally-protected opinion. The court also found that Hanks failed to sufficiently plead actual malice or special damages.

A federal judge in the Southern District of New York has dismissed a claim by a lawyer who claims that his ex-lovers tortiously interfered with his prospective business relationships by posting allegedly defamatory material on the Internet. In Matthew Couloute, Jr. v. Amanda Ryncarz and Stacey Blitsch, the judge held that the lawyer failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted and denied his motion for leave to amend.

Couloute had previously dated both Ryncarz and Blitsch. After the relationships ended, Ryncarz and Blitsch posted comments on an Internet site, www.liarscheatersrus.com, painting Couloute in an unfavorable light. Both women expressed their views that Couloute was a liar and a cheater, that he was manipulative and that he used the people in his life to get what he wanted. Couloute sued them both, arguing that these statements were defamatory and that they caused him damage by interfering with his law practice in New York. He claimed that the woman made the statements with the specific purpose of causing him financial trouble. The court disagreed.

Applying New York law (which closely parallels Virginia law in this area), the court said that the plaintiff’s complaint could not stand because it did not contain all of the elements for a claim of tortious interference with prospective business relations. To state a proper claim, the plaintiff would have to allege: “(1) business relations with a third party; (2) the defendant’s interference with those business relations; (3) the defendant acted with the sole purpose of harming the plaintiff or used dishonest, unfair, or improper means; and (4) injury to the business relationship.” In this case, Couloute failed to allege a specific business relationship with which the defendants interfered.

Is truth an absolute defense to a defamation claim? Despite what you may have read elsewhere, the answer (here in Virginia) is no. Aside from the fact that falsity is an element of the claim that needs to be proven by the plaintiff (rather than an issue to be raised as a defense), “defamation by implication” is a developing area of the law in which liability can be based on a statement that is literally true. Not all implications and inferences will be actionable; the speaker must have intended to imply a defamatory meaning. (See Pendleton v. Newsome, 290 Va. 162, 174 (2015)). To prevail in a defamation-by-implication case in Virginia, a plaintiff must prove:

  1. that the defendant made the statements alleged in the complaint,
  2. that the statements, even if facially true, were designed and intended by the defendant to imply a defamatory meaning,

The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals is poised to rule on the appeal of NASCAR driver Jeremy Allen Mayfield, who is appealing the dismissal of his case involving claims of defamation, breach of contract, and deceptive trade practices. The trial court had dismissed the case based in large part on contractual release and indemnification provisions, including a release of liability arising from the publication of the results of any substance-abuse test.

Mayfield entered into a written contract with NASCAR in which he agreed to submit to random drug testing. On May 1, 2009, NASCAR asked Mayfield to submit to such a test. He complied and informed David Black, the president of Aegis, the chemical company performing the test, that he had taken Claritin and Adderall just prior to submitting a sample for testing. On May 7, 2009, Mayfield was informed that his test came back positive for amphetamines. After some confusion about the number of samples and whether Aegis tested the correct sample, NASCAR informed Mayfield that he was suspended as a driver and as the owner of a team. The president of NASCAR, Brian France, then held a press conference announcing to the world that Mayfield had been suspended for taking either performance-enhancing or recreational drugs.

After the press conference, Black informed reporters that the positive test result had nothing to do with any over-the-counter medication. As a result of these public statements, Mayfield and his corporate NASCAR team filed suit against NASCAR, NASCAR.jpgFrance, Aegis, and Black, claiming that they were responsible for publicly defaming him. Mayfield argued in the suit that the statements were “intentional, malicious, reckless and false.”

When SolAVerde’s attorney spoke to the media about his client’s defamation claims against the Town of Front Royal and certain councilmen, he sounded pretty confident. The court, however, disagreed with his arguments and dismissed the Town from the lawsuit, finding it to be immune. The court also dismissed the defamation claims against the other defendants, but left the door open for SolAVerde, a Virginia solar energy company, to amend its claims against them.

The Complaint alleged that the defendants, in effect, accused the owners of SolAVerde of offering a bribe to public officials in connection with the bidding on a contract for a solar energy processing and production facility. According to plaintiff, a member of the Front Royal town council, whom they were unable to identify specifically, leaked a memorandum to the news media that raised the question of whether certain proposed monetary incentives were actually bribes. The plaintiffs sought $30 million in reputational damages.

However, in a May 26, 2011, opinion, Judge Paul Peatross Jr., sitting by designation in the Warren County court, dismissed the defamation claim. He found that the town was entitled to sovereign immunity because whatever the council members had done in connection with the bids and the possible contract, they were making a governmental decision. “The doctrine of sovereign warren_courthouse.jpgimmunity protects municipalities from tort liability arising out of the exercise of governmental functions,” he wrote. Judge Peatross concluded that the acts alleged by the plaintiffs, including the alleged leak of the document, “amount to a governmental function by the Town of Front Royal acting in its legislative capacity regarding the consideration of solar power for the Town of Front Royal,” and that the town is thus immune from defamation liability.

Virginia courts have long held that statements made in connection with judicial proceedings are entitled to absolute protection from defamation liability. To encourage truthfulness in litigation, Virginia public policy has extended an absolute privilege to statements made in a party’s pleadings, statements made during depositions, and to the testimony of witnesses at trial, provided the statements are generally relevant to the proceeding. But what protection, if any, should be afforded to pre-litigation statements, such as those contained in a demand letter to a prospective defendant?

Fairfax Circuit Court Judge R. Terrence Ney recently had the opportunity to consider whether a defamation claim could be based on allegedly defamatory statements made in a draft complaint forwarded to a small group of prospective defendants for purposes of exploring settlement opportunities prior to filing suit. The issue has not yet been decided by the Virginia Supreme Court, and is particularly interesting because the ethical rules that prohibit lawyers from making frivolous claims arguably do not apply to statements made outside a judicial proceeding. As a result, when drafting pre-litigation demand letters, many lawyers are far less assiduous in their fact-checking than they would be when filing an actual pleading with the court.

In a sense, the situation is similar to the question of whether to grant a privilege to a law firm’s statements in a press release announcing a lawsuit. If a complaint contains defamatory statements, they would not be actionable, even if made with knowledge of their falsity, due to the absolute privilege for statements made in judicial proceedings. A press release discussingFairfax_courthouse.jpg the lawsuit, however, is made outside the judicial proceeding, so it does not enjoy the same level of protection. Like a press release, a demand letter containing a draft complaint is very closely related to a judicial proceeding, or at least a contemplated one, but is not part of the proceeding itself.

Consumer review sites continue to grow in popularity. Sites like Angie’s List, Avvo, and Yelp (to name but a few) allow people to post their experiences with lawyers, doctors, hairdressers, restaurants, roofers, and just about anyone else, and assign a rating to the service provider they used. When used honestly, these sites can provide a benefit to consumers. But they can also provide a mechanism for bogus reviews intended to maliciously destroy a business’s reputation. Here in Virginia, negative reviews are often the subject of defamation lawsuits.

In general, the First Amendment protects expressions of opinions on these sites. All legitimate reviews, both positive and negative, can help consumers come to well-informed conclusions. Negative reviews, however, cross the line if they include false statements of fact. Consumers are free to express unfavorable opinions regarding their experiences with a service provider, but the First Amendment does not allow them to defame the service provider by posting false information.

A Texas lawyer recently filed a defamation action, claiming that a negative review that he received on Citysearch.com was not only derogatory but false and was the result of a conspiracy to defame him, evidently in retaliation for his decision to fire a paralegal at report card.jpghis law firm. Attorney Michael Weston sued his former paralegal and the man believed to be her husband.

Did an Associated Press reporter commit a foul against an NBA referee earlier this year by defaming him on Twitter during a league game? On March 14, 2011, National Basketball Association official Bill Spooner filed a federal defamation case against Associated Press sports beat reporter Jon Krawczynski for a brief item that Krawczynski wrote on his Twitter account that suggested Spooner was officiating a game dishonestly. During an NBA game between the Minnesota Timberwolves and the Houston Rockets on January 24, 2011, Krawczynski tweeted (twote?) that Spooner told Minnesota coach Kurt Rambis after an allegedly bad call against a Minnesota player that Rambis would “get it back,” and that Spooner went on to compensate for the incorrect call with a “make-up” call against Houston.

Spooner says that although he had a brief verbal exchange with Rambis about the foul call, he said nothing to the coach about giving anything back to the Timberwolves. His lawsuit, filed in the U.S. District Court for the District of Minnesota, says Krawczynski defamed him by telling Krawczynski’s Twitter followers in effect that Spooner had engaged in a “form of game fixing.” Spooner discusses in his complaint that the NBA was recently caught up in a controversy involving former ref Tim Donaghy, who pleaded guilty in federal court in 2007 after being accused of betting on games that he officiated.

The NBA itself discouraged the lawsuit, although it doesn’t believe Spooner actually cheated either. According to a league spokesman, “We investigated the content of the tweet when it appeared, found it to be without substance, and informedBball.jpg Mr. Spooner that we considered the matter closed. We subsequently advised Mr. Spooner’s lawyer that we did not think suing a journalist over an incorrect tweet would be productive.”

Kids these days. The use of fake IDs by teens is nothing new, but when that ID contains the name of a real person, and the imposter goes on to do naughty things while posing as someone else, the law of defamation can come into play. And if you’re inclined to post a YouTube video of that identity thief engaged in acts of questionable moral character, you’d better conduct some due diligence to ensure you don’t destroy someone’s reputation. That’s a lesson that Joe Francis, the entrepreneur behind the risqué “Girls Gone Wild” videos, may have just learned as a result of a $3 million default judgment entered against him earlier this month in New Jersey federal court.

In a complicated scenario typical of the Internet age, in 2008 Francis wanted to take advantage of that year’s scandal involving New York Gov. Eliot Spitzer and a prostitute named Ashley Alexandra Dupre. He offered Dupre $1 million to appear in a magazine spread and participate in a promotional tour for “Girls Gone Wild,” but withdrew his offer when he found that he already had useful footage of Dupre from five years before, when she was 17 years old.

After Francis used the footage, Dupre sued him, claiming that she was underage and did not understand the release she had signed. However, Francis was able to come up Fake IDs.jpgwith a video of Dupre providing consent to appear in “Girls Gone Wild,” stating that she was 18, and showing the driver’s license of another woman who was of legal age. Dupre then dropped her suit against Francis.

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