The Virginia Defamation Law Blog

September 15, 2021

Misrepresentation of the Reasons for Termination of Employment

A common concern among employees who quit their jobs or get fired is that their former employer will badmouth them to their colleagues or prospective employers, interfering with their ability to earn a livelihood. Although there are some benefits to getting fired versus quitting (e.g., unemployment benefits, severance packages), most people would prefer to have the record reflect a voluntary separation rather than an involuntary one, which usually implies poor performance on behalf of the employee. If you’re reading this, you’re probably wondering whether you would have a potential libel or slander claim against your former employer if that employer tells people that you were fired for bad behavior when the truth of the matter is that you either quit or were asked to leave through no fault of your own. The answer, as it so often is when dealing with legal problems, is maybe. It depends on why you left your former job, and what, exactly, your former employer communicated to others about the reasons for the separation.

The Virginia Supreme Court has recognized that misrepresenting the reasons for an employee’s termination may be sufficient grounds for a defamation lawsuit. In Government Micro Res., Inc. v. Jackson, 271 Va. 29 (2006), evidence showed that after a company fired its President and CEO, others were told that the CEO had “mismanaged the company” and “had been removed from his job because he lost $3 million.” The evidence also showed that these statements were untrue and that they were made with the intent to defame the former CEO and harm his ability to gain employment with a competitor. These facts were deemed sufficient to support a multi-million dollar defamation verdict. (Note: The holding wasn’t based on an accusation merely of “mismanagement,” which surely would have been deemed non-actionable opinion, but rather the coupling of that statement with an assertion that the CEO’s mismanagement resulted in substantial financial losses which were the basis for his termination. Those are factual statements, as they can be proven true or false).

July 28, 2021

Ferrum College Found Not Liable for Implied Defamation

by Lee E. Berlik

When a person’s reputation is attacked, sometimes what stings the most is not so much what was actually said but what was implied. Virginia recognizes defamation by implication claims and permits plaintiffs to recover when (1) the defendant makes a statement designed and intended to imply certain false and defamatory facts, (2) in a context that would cause reasonable listeners or readers to infer the intended defamatory meaning, and (3) the plaintiff suffers harm as a result. (See Pendleton v. Newsome, 290 Va. 162, 175 (2015)). To be actionable, however, the inference urged by the plaintiff must be a reasonable one; if the judge has to squint her eyes and stretch her imagination to interpret the defendant’s statement the way the plaintiff is interpreting it, she will likely dismiss the case at the outset. That’s what happened earlier this year in a case brought against Ferrum College by its former athletic director.

June 23, 2021

Former City Attorney Found to Retain Public Figure Status

by Lee E. Berlik

Public officials have an uphill battle when seeking to sue media outlets for defamation. The public has a legitimate interest in the workings of government and reporters have the right and privilege to communicate information about the actions of public officials so that the government can be held accountable. Consequently, the law has evolved to make it difficult for public officials to sue media organizations for libel, even if a news story about them contains inaccuracies. Specifically, public officials can’t prevail in a defamation action based on their official conduct unless they can prove, with clear and convincing evidence, that the false story was published about them with actual malice, generally defined as knowledge of falsity (or, at a minimum, reckless disregard of the truth). Private individuals, by contrast, generally are not required to meet this standard. The high bar for public figures is designed to strike a balance between the private right against unfair attacks on one’s reputation and the First Amendment right of writers and publishers to share information on matters of public interest and concern. A recent decision of the Eastern District of Virginia shows how difficult it can be for public officials to meet their burden of proof.

The case of Joseph E. Preston v. City Council of the City of Petersburg involved a dispute between the City of Petersburg and its former City Attorney, Joseph Preston. The basic facts, according to the summary-judgment opinion, are as follows. Preston was the City Attorney from October 2016 to September 2018. On September 4, 2018, while Preston was on vacation, the City Council held a special meeting in his absence and passed two motions. One motion terminated Preston’s employment, effective immediately. The second motion stated that Preston would be allowed back into City Hall to retrieve his personal belongings “only by appointment and only if accompanied by a police officer.” The reasons for the firing and the restrictions on Preston’s ability to enter City Hall are not clear.

April 9, 2021

Absolute Privilege Completely Immunizes Certain Statements Against Defamation Claims

by Lee E. Berlik

Under Virginia law, an absolute privilege protects speakers and writers from defamation claims when their statements are made in certain contexts. Absolute privilege will apply if the statement claimed to be defamatory was made in connection with any of the following, provided the statement was relevant and pertinent to the matter under inquiry: (1) judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings (including preliminary proceedings sufficiently related to judicial proceedings); (2) proceedings before the Virginia Employment Commission; (3) proceedings of bodies creating legislation; or (4) military or navel communications among officers. If the absolute privilege does apply, the statement is completely immune, even if knowingly false and made maliciously. The maker of an absolutely privileged communication is accorded complete protection against defamation claims. (See Lindeman v. Lesnick, 268 Va. 532, 537 (2004)). This is far stronger protection than offered by qualified privilege, which provides only limited protection that can be defeated upon a showing of malice or other bad faith. Absolute privilege is an affirmative defense that can be raised in an answer or plea in bar. As with other affirmative defenses, absolute privilege should not be presented to the court by demurrer, as demurrers test only the facial validity of the allegations in a complaint. (See Givago Growth, LLC v. iTech AG, LLC (Va. 2021)).

By far the most common situation in which absolute privilege is invoked involves statements made in the course of a judicial proceeding. If someone lies about you in court, you can’t turn around and sue the person for slander. The adversarial judicial system is designed to allow fact finders to consider the evidence and determine the truth, and it’s a given that not every statement made by testifying witnesses in court will be truthful. There are also potential penalties for perjury for untrue statements made in court. For these and other reasons, Virginia courts have long held that statements made in connection with judicial proceedings are protected by an absolute “judicial privilege” against defamation liability when they are relevant and pertinent to the matter under inquiry. (See Darnell v. Davis, 190 Va. 701, 707 (1950)). The absolute judicial privilege protects not only witness statements made orally in court, but all statements in connection with the proceeding, including pleadings and statements made during depositions and discovery.

March 7, 2021

Implied Undisclosed Facts as Basis for Defamation Claim

by Lee E. Berlik

As a general rule, statements of opinion are not actionable as defamation. It’s also true, however, that indirect implications from a statement can form the basis of a defamation claim. When a person prefaces a statement with “in my opinion” or “I firmly believe,” it has no effect on whether the statement carries defamatory implications or innuendo. If a speaker expresses an opinion under circumstances that would cause a reasonable listener to understand that the opinion is based on the speaker’s knowledge of undisclosed facts, that “opinion” can be treated as an implied assertion of fact. And if that factual assertion isn’t true and conveys a defamatory meaning about someone, defamation liability may arise.

This isn’t really an exception to the rule that you can’t sue someone for defamation based on an expression of opinion. Pure opinions remain protected by the First Amendment. The question is whether a reasonable listener or reader would infer from a particular statement (whether couched as an opinion or otherwise) that the speaker or writer knows certain facts, unknown to the audience, which support the opinion and are detrimental to the reputation of the person about whom the statement is made. This is going to depend heavily on context, the identity of the parties, and the specific words used.

January 25, 2021

How to Prove Actual Malice

by Lee E. Berlik

Actual malice is an important concept in Virginia defamation law. Public figures, public officials, and limited-purpose public figures all must prove that a defamatory publication was made about them with actual malice as part of their case in chief in any defamation action brought on the basis of that publication. Even private plaintiffs often seek to prove actual malice, such as when trying to show that a defendant lost or abused a qualified privilege. As discussed earlier on this blog, “actual malice” in this context means something different than spite or ill will. When a defendant publishes a false and defamatory statement with actual malice, it means the defendant knew the statement was false or, at a minimum, acted with reckless disregard as to truth or falsity. Recklessness amounting to actual malice may be found, for example, where a publisher fabricates an account, makes inherently improbable allegations, relies on a source where there is an obvious reason to doubt its veracity, fails to pursue the most obvious available sources for corroboration, or deliberately ignores evidence that calls into question his published statements.

So how do you prove actual malice? As you might imagine, it’s not very often that the defendant openly admits to intentionally lying. Therefore, most of the time, plaintiffs must resort to indirect and circumstantial evidence to prove their claims. They can do this by using

all the relevant circumstances surrounding the transaction…provided they are not too remote, including threats, prior or subsequent defamations, subsequent statements of the defendant, circumstances indicating the existence of rivalry, ill will, or hostility between the parties, facts tending to show a reckless disregard of the plaintiff’s rights, and, in an action against a newspaper, custom and usage with respect to the treatment of news items of the nature of the one under consideration.

(See Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153, 164 n.12 (1979) (quoting 50 Am. Jur. 2d Libel and Slander § 455 (1970))). To obtain such evidence in advance of trial, parties may resort to the discovery process, using tools such as interrogatories, requests for production of documents, and third-party document subpoenas.

December 9, 2020

If the Lie Is Not Important, It’s Not Defamatory

by Lee E. Berlik

The law doesn’t require everyone to be completely honest in all facets of their day-to-day lives. Some lies can form the basis for a legal cause of action for defamation, fraud, business conspiracy, or other claims, but not all lies justify legal action. Some lies are more harmful than others. If someone has lied about you to other people and you are considering whether to sue for defamation, ask yourself this: has your reputation really been affected? If nobody cares about the factual error, or they respond to it with a “so what?” or a shoulder shrug, there’s a good chance the misrepresentation would not be considered defamatory by a Virginia judge.

To be considered legally actionable as libel or slander, a false statement must really sting. Meaningless insults are insufficient. Minor misrepresentations that can be easily shrugged off are insufficient. False statements about you that no one (but you) considers important are not going to cut it. What the court will be looking for are statements with defamatory meaning. Statements meeting this test are those that would tend to cause a person to be shunned from civilized society. They are statements that would tend to cause people to not want to have any personal or business dealings with the subject of the statement. People who have been legitimately defamed are those who have been exposed to public scorn and contempt as a result of false information circulating about them.

October 21, 2020

Prior Restraints of Defamatory Speech

by Lee E. Berlik

In Virginia, injunctions are considered an extraordinary remedy and, due to First Amendment concerns, are generally not available to enjoin a person from speaking. Known as “prior restraints,” injunctions against defamatory speech are disfavored and bear a heavy presumption against validity. The Supreme Court has written that “a free society prefers to punish the few who abuse rights of speech after they break the law than to throttle them…beforehand.” (See Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 559 (1975)). There are exceptions, however, such as (a) when a defendant’s defamatory speech was uttered in connection with the commission of a separate tort, (b) when a defendant engages in repeated defamation, or (c) when the speech has already been adjudicated to be defamatory.

Although neither the Virginia Supreme Court nor the Fourth Circuit has had the opportunity to consider whether a prevailing defamation plaintiff may obtain an injunction prohibiting the defendant from repeating the speech adjudicated to be defamatory, most courts around the country approve of the practice, reasoning that any other rule “would make an impecunious defamer undeterrable.” (McCarthy v. Fuller, 810 F.3d 456, 462 (7th Cir. 2015)). Earlier this year, the Eastern District of Virginia followed the trend and granted an injunction to restrain the defendant from repeating certain statements held to be defamatory.

September 19, 2020

Personal Jurisdiction in Defamation Cases

by Lee E. Berlik

When filing a defamation lawsuit against an individual, you need to select a court that has personal jurisdiction over the defendant. A Virginia court doesn’t necessarily have the authority to adjudicate a case against a resident of another state with no connections to Virginia. To determine whether a court has personal jurisdiction over a particular defendant, look first to Virginia’s “long-arm statute” to see whether any of its provisions apply. (The long-arm statute is so named because it lists the circumstances under which Virginia can extend a “long arm” to grab a resident of another state and hale him into a Virginia courtroom). If the long-arm statute does apply, the court must next ensure that exercising personal jurisdiction over that defendant would not violate the Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution. This generally means that to acquire personal jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant in a defamation case, the defendant must have purposefully directed his defamatory statement to a Virginia audience. Absent such purposeful activity, the court would likely find that haling the person into Virginia would offend “traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice,” and would therefore be unconstitutional.

To determine whether specific jurisdiction exists in a particular case, relevant considerations include:

the extent to which the defendant purposefully availed himself of the privilege of conducting activities in Virginia;
whether the plaintiff’s claims arise out of those activities directed at Virginia; and
whether the exercise of personal jurisdiction would be constitutionally reasonable.

August 29, 2020

Virginia’s Fair-Report Privilege

by Lee E. Berlik

In Virginia, the right of the media to report freely and fairly on the operations of the government is sacrosanct. Reporters and news organizations that report on government activities are shielded from defamation claims by a “fair report privilege” that applies so long as the publication is a “fair and substantially correct statement of the transcript of the record.” (See Alexandria Gazette Corp. v. West, 198 Va. 154 (1956)). The privilege protects “press reports of official actions or proceedings, so long as the report was accurate and either complete or fairly abridged.” (See Chapin v. Knight-Ridder, Inc., 993 F.3d 1087, 1097 (4th Cir. 1993)). Everyone has a right of access to public records, and the fair report privilege makes it easier for the media to communicate the information contained therein to the public so that the government can be held accountable.

Some courts view the fair report privilege or “reporter’s privilege” as an exception to the republication rule. Normally, a person who repeats a defamatory statement is liable for republishing it, just as if he or she were the original speaker. Where a reporter repeats a defamatory statement made at a proceeding covered by the fair report privilege, however, no republication liability will attach provided the report is a fair characterization of what was originally said. If a media account of a government proceeding is fair and accurate, the publisher will be protected even if statements made at the proceeding and repeated in the publication were false and defamatory.